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COMMENT 
TAKING THE SQUARE PEG OUT 






It was a watershed victory for the gay and lesbian 
community when United States courts first recognized that 
sexual orientation was a legal ground for membership III a 
particular social group for asylum-seeking purposes.! This 
1 In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990). Prior to 1990, sexual 
orientation was not recognized as a protected social group for purposes of asylum 
applications. With the landmark Toboso-Alfonso decision, sexual orientation was 
recognized as immutable. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) specifically noted 
that "the service has not challenged the immigration judge's finding that 
homosexuality is an 'immutable characteristic' nor further 'that that characterization 
is subject to change."' Id. at 820-22. In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno designated 
Toboso-Alfonso as administrative precedent, affirming that "an individual who has 
been identified as homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that reason 
alone may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the basis of persecution 
because of membership in a social group." Memorandum from Attorney General Janet 
Reno to Mary Maguire Dunne, Acting Chair, Board of Immigration Appeals 1 (June 16, 
1994), available at http://www.qrd.org/qrdlworldlimmigration/us.gay .asylum. policy-
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gave an unprecedented number of gay and lesbian asylum 
seekers the ability to escape persecution in their countries of 
origin and begin new lives in the United States. Although 
transgender individuals fall under the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) umbrella, they present a distinct set 
of issues that serve to distinguish them from gay and lesbian 
asylum seekers. In the social schema, trans-identified 
individuals may be more visible, viewed as more transgressive 
of social norms, and thus subject to greater discrimination and 
persecution within a society.2 From the judicial perspective, 
trans gender individuals can present blurred social and 
biological paradigms, often resulting in an erroneous 
adjudication contrary to the applicant's identity. Although the 
judicial system has recently begun to affirm the rights of 
trans gender and transsexual individuals in the civil and 
employment context, there is a dearth of case law recognizing 
the trans-community in the immigration context, and 
specifically, transgender asylum applicants. 
For purposes of obtaining asylum, many transgender 
individuals are forced to embrace membership in the social 
group "homosexual" even though this accepted social group 
does not always match a transgender applicant's sexual 
orientation. The transgender identity as a man or a woman is 
distinct from the broad range of sexual orientations the 
trans gender community encompasses.3 Consequently, the 
homosexual particular social group subsumes a trans gender 
asylum applicant into a sexual identity he or she may not 
possess. This erroneous application leaves the claimant 
without accurate legal recognition. 
Global Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 20-21 
(1996). 
2 See generally INT'L GAY AND LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, SEXUAL 
MINORITIES AND THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE 
(June 5, 2001) (describing how doctors and nurses routinely leave transvestites to wait 
for hours in emergency wards, even if there are no other patients; in Mexico, twenty 
transvestites were kept for five nights in a cell measuring three square meters. They 
were denied both food and blankets); see also Arwen Swink, Note, Queer RefUge: A 
Review of the Role of Country Condition Analysis in Asylum Adjudications fOr 
Members of Sexual Minorities, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 251, 253 (2006). 
3 Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and 
Legal Conceptualization of Gender That is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 260-61 (2005) ("Transgender people have all sexual 
orientations: some transgender people are straight, some are gay, some are bisexual, 
and some are queer."). Id. at 270. 
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The limited interpretation of the appropriate social group 
the federal circuits have applied to transgender asylum claims 
reflects prevalent misunderstandings that permeate this social 
and biological identity.4 The social group currently applied to 
transgender individuals is socially inaccurate and 
unnecessarily narrow. Instead, the immigration system should 
adopt a separate and distinct social group for transgender 
applicants so they can legitimately claim lawful grounds for 
asylum. To allay criticisms that recognition of the trans gender 
identity for asylum purposes may result in an amorphous 
particular social group, there are comparable legal victories for 
the trans gender community in the civil and employment 
contexts warranting similar protection in the immigration 
court system. 
Part I provides the basic definitions and understandings 
this Comment will adopt within the transgender paradigm and 
provides an overview of United States asylum procedures and 
the immigration court structure. Part II discusses asylum 
applications based on sexual orientation and will address how 
subsequent cases have erroneously applied this social group to 
transgender applicants. Part II further highlights examples of 
adjudicatory issues that transgender asylum seekers may face 
as a result of not identifying as homosexual. Part III 
showcases the recognition and protection afforded to 
transgender plaintiffs in pivotal civil discrimination cases and, 
as a result, how their rights have been correspondingly 
protected. This Comment concludes with a recommendation 
that the immigration judicial system modify its current 
definition of "particular social group" to explicitly recognize the 
"transgender identity" for asylum purposes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 
Throughout the course of Western history, society has 
constructed gender norms that often assume individuals are 
4 Throughout this paper, when referring to the claimants highlighted in the 
court decisions discussed, I will use the appropriate pronoun for the applicant's gender 
identity. Many of the decisions erroneously refer to the applicant using a pronoun that 
coincides with the sexual identity assigned to them at birth. 
3
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born male or female and should behave accordingly.5 The 
transgender term encompasses an individual whose anatomic 
sex may conflict with their gender expression and whose birth 
sex does not match their internal perception of their gender 
identity. 6 Broadly speaking, "sex" is typically used to refer to 
an individual's identity as it relates to biology, including, but 
not limited to, chromosomal and/or reproductive composition. 7 
In contrast, "gender" may be based on an individual's social 
identity as related or unrelated to sex but often involving 
culturally associated masculine or feminine norms.8 A 
transgender individual presents a unique gender identity that 
the general public is often ignorant of or misunderstands.9 
It is important to note that there is no direct causal 
connection between gender identity and sexual orientation.lO 
Gender identity is who one is, whereas sexual orientation 
describes those to whom one is attracted. ll Transgender 
individuals may identify as heterosexual, lesbian, bisexual, 
gay, queer, and any number of other categories of sexual 
orientations. 12 Accordingly, when discussing and practicing the 
law surrounding transgender issues, it is important not only to 
understand the appropriate terms but also to look to what 
terms the individual prefers to use when defining himself or 
5 Amanda S. Eno, Note, The Misconception of "Sex" in Title VII· Federal Courts 
Reevaluate Transsexual Employment Discrimination Claims, 43 TULSA L. REV. 765, 
766 (2008) (citing Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 24, 32 (2003) (discussing how society sets out standards for how 
people should act within their gender category)). 
6 See generally TRANSGENDER RIGHTS (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, & 
Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006). 
7 Francine Tilewick Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, "Because ofSex'~· The Evolving 
Legal Riddle of Sexual vs. Gender Identity, 32 J.C. & V.L. 361, 362 (2006). 
8 I d. 
9 Cf. Transgender Law Ctr., Top 5 Tips for Working with Transgender Clients 
and Co-Workers, 
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf!I'op%205%20tips%20on%20clients%20and%20co-
workers.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (stressing the importance of being aware of 
gender assumptions, using the correct name in all correspondence, and inquiring into 
medical history and surgery). 
10 Vade, supra note 3, at 270; see also Ben Lunine, Transitioning Your Services: 
Serving Transgender Victims of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking, 'II 5, 
http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/pdflLunineSummer2008.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009). 
II Vade, supra note 3, at 270. 
12 Id. 
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herself as indicative of that person's gender identity.13 
B. AsYLUM PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Asylum law in the United States finds its foundational and 
substantive support in the United Nations Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, commonly referred to as the Geneva 
Convention.14 Enacted subsequent to the mass shifting of 
refugees worldwide following World War II, the Geneva 
Convention has been interpreted by various state actors 
broadly and in response to a variety of changing 
circumstances. 15 In 1968, the United States adopted the 
Protocol to the United Nations Convention Relating the Status 
of Refugees (U.N. Refugee Protocol), which encompassed the 
Geneva Convention's basic terms. 16 The United States has 
subsequently incorporated the U.N. Refugee Protocol's 
definition of asylum into its body of immigration law. 17 The 
text of the U.N. Refugee Protocol, therefore, remains the 
essence of asylum jurisprudence in the United States. IS 
The U.N. Refugee Protocol's definition of refugee, as 
articulated in section lOl(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), provides protection to any person who 
can establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted on 
13 JOAN M. BURDA, GAY, LESBIAN, AND TRANSGENDER CLIENTS: A LAWYER'S 
GUIDE, 3 (2008). 
14 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, arl. 1, opened for signature 
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6259 (entry into force Apr. 22, 
1954); see also Monica Saxena, More Than Mere Semantics: The Case for an Expansive 
Definition of Persecution in Sexual Minority Asylum Claims, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
331,336 (2006). 
15 Saxena, supra note 14, at 336. 
16 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I § 2, opened 
for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entry into force Oct. 4, 
1967); see also DEBORAH ANKER, THE LAW OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (3d ed. 
1999); Paul O'Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear of Having My Sexual Orientation Asylum 
Claim Heard in the Wrong Court, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 187 (2007-2008). 
17 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42)(A) 
(Westlaw 2009); see also ANKER, supra note 16, at 4. In 1952, the McCarran-Walter 
bill- passed into law as the Immigration and Nationality Act - consolidated previous 
immigration laws into one statute. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
Congress later passed the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) 
(codified at various sections of 8 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.). See generally Thomas 
Alexander Aleinikoff et al., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 173-
78 (6th ed. 2008). 
18 See O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 187. 
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account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his or her nationality, and, due to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country. 19 "A well-founded fear" involves an assessment based 
on both subjective and objective elements of the prospective 
asylee's claim.20 Therefore, under U.S. immigration law, an 
applicant may qualify for asylum either because the applicant 
has suffered past persecution or because he or she has a well-
founded fear of future persecution, but only if the applicant can 
point to a nexus between the persecution and one of the five 
protected grounds. 21 
Transgender asylum applicants who have been subject to 
19 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42)(A) 
(Westlaw 2009); see also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, 19 
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entry into force Apr. 22, 1954). 
20 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 'II 1, 8 §§ 37-38, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/IP/4/ENGIREV (1992), aV811able at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
binltexislvtxlsearch?page=search&docid=3d58e13b4&query=handbook%200n%20proce 
dures%20and%20criteria%20for%20determining%20refugee%20status. ("Since fear is 
subjective, the definition involves a subjective element in the person applying for 
recognition as a refugee. Determination of refugee status will therefore primarily 
require an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than a judgment on the 
situation prevailing in his country of origin. To the element of fear - a state of mind 
and a subjective condition - is added the qualification 'well-founded.' This implies 
that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines his 
refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported by an objective situation. 
The term 'well-founded fear' therefore contains a subjective and an objective element, 
and in determining whether well-founded fear exists, both elements must be taken into 
consideration."). The UNHCR Handbook goes on to explain that "[tjhere is no 
universally accepted definition of 'persecution,' and various attempts to formulate such 
a definition have met with little success ... [ilt may be inferred tlIat a threat to life or 
freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a 
particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights 
- for the same reasons - would also constitute persecution." Id. at 10 § 51. "Needless 
to say, it is not possible to lay down a general rule as to what cumulative reasons can 
give rise to a valid claim to refugee status. This will necessarily depend on all the 
circumstances, including the particular geographical, historical and ethnological 
context." Id. at § 53. The UNHCR Handbook has been recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court as persuasive authority when interpreting the U.N. Refugee Protocol. 
See generally INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437-39 (1987). 
21 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (Westlaw 2009): A showing of past persecution creates a 
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution, which the government may rebut by 
a preponderance of the evidence that either country conditions have changed to such a 
degree that a well-founded fear of future persecution does not exist or that the person 
could safely relocate within the country of origin; see also O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 
191. 
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genuine and violent persecution on account of their sexual 
identity often do so under the "membership in a particular 
social group" umbrella. The U.N. Refugee Protocol does not 
provide a definition of "particular social group." As a result, 
the courts have had to fashion their own definitions of what 
constitutes membership in this category.22 The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) stated that a "particular social 
group" comprises members who possess an immutable 
characteristic, one that members cannot change or should not 
be required to change because it is fundamental to their 
individual identities or consciences. 23 However, this definition 
is binding only on immigration judges and Department of 
Homeland Security employees.24 In Hernandez-Montiel v. 
INS,25 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reconciled its "particular social group" definition set forth in an 
earlier decision with that of the BIA.26 It is now settled that 
LGBT applicants who have been persecuted on account of their 
sexual orientation must satisfy definitions determined under 
the protected category of "particular social group" in order to 
satisfY asylum requirements.27 
C. IMMIGRATION COURT STRUCTURE AND PRECEDENTIAL 
IMPACT 
With the exception of asylum granted by asylum officers, 
an immigration judge is involved in proceedings for all 
defensive applications for asylum and withholding of removal 
22 Christi Jo Benson, Note, Crossing Borders: A Focus on Treatment of 
Transgender Individuals in US. Asylum Law and Society, 30 WHI'ITIER L. REV. 41, 54 
(2008). 
23 In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), abrogated by 
Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997). 
24 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(g) (Westlaw 2009). 
25 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
26 [d. at 1093. After Acosta, the Ninth Circuit, in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS., 
broadened the Acosta requirement of immutability, ruling that "particular social group 
implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by 
some common impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary 
associational relationship among the purported members, which imparts some common 
characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social 
group." Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). 
27 Victoria Neilson, Uncharted Territory: Choosing an Effective Approach in 
Transgender-Based Asylum Claims, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J 265, 270 (2005). 
7
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and also serves as a second review of denials of asylum made 
by asylum officers. 28 The BIA is the administrative body that 
hears appeals from the immigration court. Each year the BIA 
publishes approximately 50 decisions out of the roughly 4,000 
cases that it hears.29 These serve as binding precedents for 
immigration judges.3o 
If the BIA rules against a claimant, he or she may appeal 
to the federal court of appeals with jurisdiction over the case.3! 
The decisions of a court of appeals are binding on the 
immigration courts within that court's circuit, as well as on the 
BIA when it reviews cases that originate in that circuit.32 If a 
"court of appeals adopts a different rule than the BIA, the new 
rule will be applied within that court's circuit in future cases.,,33 
Consequently, the law applied by the BIA or an immigration 
judge can differ by federal circuit when there is a split between 
the circuits or when a particular issue has been decided in one 
circuit but not another.34 As a result of the small number of 
published cases, the even smaller number designated as 
precedent, and the precedential impact of the courts of appeals 
on various immigration courts around the country, different 
definitions and criteria have been established, leading to 
confusion and at times contradictory immigration 
adjudications.35 
28 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231 (Westlaw 
2009) ([T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney 
General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country 
because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.). 
29 Neilson, supra note 27, at 267. 
30 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY (4th ed., 
2005) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2004)). 
31 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(O), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(0) 
(Westlaw 2009). 
32 Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) ("A federal agency is 
obligated to follow circuit court precedent in cases originating within that circuit.") 
(citing NRLB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(overruled on other grounds by Parussimovo v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 
2008))); see also O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 193. 
33 Alan G. Bennett, The "Cure" That Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum 
and the Changing Definition of Persecution, 29 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 279, 285 
(1999). 
34 O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 193. 
35 Neilson, supra note 27, at 267. Because of the dearth of published opinions, it 
is difficult to determine or analyze whether important decisions, and corresponding 
trends, are occurring within the system. At the BIA level few decisions are released; of 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT TRANSGENDER PARTICULAR 
SOCIAL GROUP 
75 
While a claim of homosexuality is now an accepted means 
of establishing membership in a particular social group for 
asylum purposes, the BIA and the courts of appeals have yet to 
recognize a claim of transgender or transsexual identity in a 
similar way.36 The Ninth Circuit has come the closest to 
affording protection to transgender applicants by utilizing a 
specific set of descriptors, without directly stating that those 
who possess a transgender or transsexual identity constitute a 
distinct social group for purposes of asylum.37 Section A of this 
part discusses attempts by various circuit courts to apply a 
social group to trans gender applicants and the resultant 
creation of an unnecessarily narrow and arbitrary social group. 
This is highlighted in Section B by two examples of legal 
hurdles a prospective transgender applicant might face under 
current asylum law. 
A. THE CREATION OF A SOCIAL GROUP FOR TRANSGENDER 
APPLICANTS BY THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
1. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS: Beginning to Recognize the 
Transgender Asylum Applicant 
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit first addressed the case of a 
trans gender asylum applicant, holding in Hernandez-Montiel 
these published decisions, the vast majority involve asylum denials. Id.; see also 
Leonard Birdsong, "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender 
Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . .. ':. The New Grounds for 
Grants of Asylum, 32 NOVA L. REV. 357,373-74 (2008) (citing Stuart Grider, Sexual 
Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States-In re Tenorio, No. A 72 093 
558 (EOIR Immigration Court, July 26, 1993), 35 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 213, 215 (1994). 
Moreover, the number of published opinions, including circuit decisions, addressing 
LGBT issues is minuscule. This creates a system in which it is nearly impossible for 
the claimant or the immigration judge to discern clear standards necessary to establish 
a successful asylum claim, and particularly a claim based upon sexual orientation and 
identity persecution. See generally Robert C. Leitner, Comment, A Flawed System 
Exposed: The Immigration Adjudicatory System and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 679, 695-99 (2004). 
36 In re Toboso-Alfonso, 201. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990). 
37 Joseph Landau, "Soft Immutability" and "Imputed Gay Identity": Recent 
Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237,246 (2005). 
9
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v. INS. that "gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico" 
constituted a "particular social group" for the purposes of 
asylum.3s Hernandez-Montiel, a Mexican national the court 
referred to as "Geovanni," realized at the age of eight "that [he] 
was attracted to people of [his] same sex.'>39 Beginning at age 
twelve, Geovanni began dressing and behaving as a woman.40 
Geovanni faced repeated and consistent abuse and persecution 
at the hands of both private individuals and government 
officials. 41 After Geovanni was expelled from school for refusing 
to change sexual orientation, Geovanni's parents threw 
Geovanni out of their home.42 When Geovanni was fourteen 
years old, police officers forced Geovanni into their car, drove to 
a deserted area, and forced Geovanni to perform oral sex.43 
Two weeks later, Geovanni was raped by the same officers.44 
Geovanni fled to the United States at age fifteen but was 
arrested and returned to Mexico several days later.45 Upon 
return to Mexico, Geovanni lived with a sister who attempted 
to "cure" Geovanni's sexual orientation.46 She enrolled 
Geovanni in a counseling program, which altered Geovanni's 
female appearance by cutting Geovanni's hair and nails in a 
masculine style, and forced Geovanni to discontinue taking 
female hormones. 47 Geovanni again entered the United States 
on or around October 12, 1994, and applied for asylum and 
withholding of deportation within the year.48 
The Ninth Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel expressly held 
that a "particular social group" is "one united by a voluntary 
association . . . or by an innate characteristic that is so 
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members 
that members either cannot or should not be required to 
change it.')49 Based on testimony from leading experts in Latin 
38 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000). 
39 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087 (brackets in original) . 
• 0 Id . 
• 1 Id. at 1088 . 
• 2 Id. 
'3 Id. 
4. Id. 
,5 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1088. 
,6 Id. 
47 Id. 
.8 Id. at 1089. 
,9 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093 (emphasis in original). 
10
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American history and culture, Geovanni was able to convince 
the court of the longstanding persecution of "gay men with 
'female' sexual identities in Mexico" by police and other groups 
within the society. 50 The court stated in a footnote that 
"Geovanni's brief states that he [sic] 'may be considered a 
transsexual.",51 Despite this, the court went on to state "[w]e 
need not consider in this case whether transsexuals constitute 
a particular social groUp."52 Nevertheless, the court's ruling in 
favor of Geovanni signaled a greater inclusiveness for 
transgender asylum applicants, broadened the Ninth Circuit's 
definition of "particular social group" and brought it into 
greater alignment with the BIA's definition. 53 However, by 
recognizing the particular social group of "gay men with female 
sexual identities," rather than "transsexuals" it created a 
particular social group that was unnecessarily limiting and 
arguably sociologically incorrect as related to Geovanni's sexual 
orientation. 54 
2. The Ninth Circuit Continues to Recognize the "Gay Men 
with Female Sexual Identities" Particular Social Group 
The broadened definition of "particular social group" under 
which an asylum seeker could apply was upheld in two later 
Ninth Circuit decisions, Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcrod5 and Ornelas-
Chavez v. Gonzales.56 In Reyes-Reyes, the court affirmed its 
recognition of a "homosexual male" with a "deep female 
identity" by overturning the lower court's removal order for the 
50 Id. at 1089. 
51 I d. at 1095 n.7. The court then dermed a transsexual as "a person who is 
genetically and physically a member of one sex but has a deep-seated psychological 
conviction that he or she belongs, or ought to belong, to the opposite sex, a conviction 
which may in some cases result in the individual's decision to undergo surgery in order 
to physically modify his or her sex organs to resemble those of the opposite sex." Id. 
(citing Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Transvestism or Transsexuaiism of Spouse as 
JustifYing Divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725 n. 2 (1978)). 
52 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1095 n.7. 
53 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985) (derming "particular 
social group" to "mean persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a 
member of a group of person all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic"). 
54 The Hernandez-Montiel court did not directly discuss what Geovanni's sexual 
orientation was, rather, it automatically ascribed "homosexual" to him without any 
discussion. 
55 Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004). 
56 Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Salvadoran transgender petitioner. 57 Reyes-Reyes was 
ineligible for asylum because the application was filed after the 
one-year deadline. 58 However, Reyes-Reyes was eligible for 
relief under two "withholding of removal" statutes, both of 
which have requirements similar to those of an asylum 
application. 59 Although the court used the male pronoun "he" 
when referring to the applicant, it included the term 
"transsexual" in a footnote, which affirmed the term Reyes's 
counsel used throughout the proceeding. so The court stated, 
"[w]e note, however, that Reyes's sexual orientation, for which 
he [sic] was targeted, and his [sic] transsexual behavior are 
intimately connected."sl 
While the decision affirmed the expansive definition of 
"particular social group" the Ninth Circuit continues to apply to 
prospective trans gender asylum seekers,S2 it does not go far 
enough. The Reyes-Reyes court unnecessarily interrelated 
Reyes's sexual orientation and transsexual identity and refused 
to accurately recognize Reyes's female identity,S3 despite the 
fact that, according to the court, she had transitioned prior to 
the proceeding. Instead, the court described Reyes-Reyes 
throughout the opinion as a "homosexual male," without any 
discussion of whether Reyes-Reyes actually identified as 
homosexual while simultaneously acknowledging that Reyes-
57 Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785, 789. 
58 I d. at 786-87. 
59 I d. at 787-89. First, Reyes-Reyes was eligible for withholding of removal 
under the Convention Against Torture, which creates a mandatory prohibition against 
returning someone to a country if "it is more likely than not that he or she would be 
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) 
(Westlaw 2009). Reyes-Reyes was also eligible for withholding of removal under 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3) (Westlaw 2009), 
under which he could not be removed if his "life or freedom would be threatened." IRA 
J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 383 (lOth ed. 2006) (citing 
Article 33 of the Protocol). 
60 Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785 n.1. 
61 I d. 
62 Hollis V. Pfitsch, Homosexuality in Asylum and Constitutional Law: Rhetoric 
of Acts and Identity, 15 LAw & SEXUALITY 59, 70 (2006) (citing Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d 
at 787). 
63 Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785 n.1. The court interconnected Reyes-Reyes's 
sexual identity and sexual orientation despite noting that urals we have recognized, it 
is well-accepted among social scientists that '[slexual identity is inherent to one's very 
identity as a person .... Sexual identity goes beyond sexual conduct and manifests 
itself outwardly, often through dress and appearance.'" Id. (quoting Hernandez-Montiel 
v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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Reyes did not identifY as a "male." 
In Ornelas-Chavez, the Ninth Circuit upheld its earlier 
recognition of gay men with female sexual identities, again 
providing protection to a transgender woman under this 
narrow and misleading descriptor. 64 Ornelas-Chavez, a 
Mexican national, was beaten and raped on several occasions 
by male family members, and then shunned by family 
throughout childhood and early adolescence. 65 Ornelas-Chavez 
reported the sexual abuse to a teacher who, rather than notifY 
the authorities, responded that she "shouldn't do that because 
only homosexuals did that.',s6 After arrest and detention by the 
local police chief, who was trying to "teach" Ornelas-Chavez "to 
behave," Ornelas-Chavez was told that the detention would be 
extended if the police chief "found out again he [sic] was 
sexually involved with men.',s7 At a later date, two of Ornelas-
Chavez's homosexual acquaintances were killed by the police.68 
The men were found stabbed to death with sticks inserted in 
their rectums.69 Ornelas-Chavez later moved to another part of 
Mexico and resided there for five years without significant 
harm.70 However, then Ornelas-Chavez's father arrived 
unexpectedly, attacked her, and broke her nose with a bottle.71 
Ornelas-Chavez then fled Mexico for the United States.72 
The immigration judge and BIA denied asylum, on the 
basis that a six-hour detention did not constitute persecution.73 
The remaining claims of persecution failed because Ornelas-
Chavez failed to report them to government authorities. 74 The 
Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed and remanded the case, 
holding that Ornelas-Chavez was not required to report the 
persecution if caused by a private party the government was 
unwilling or unable to control. 75 Although the decision did not 
64 Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006). 
65 Id. at 1054. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (first "[sic]" in original). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 154-55. 




75 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058 (stating that an applicant who seeks to 
establish withholding of removal "on the basis of past persecution at the hands of 
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discuss the claimant's sexual orientation directly, the court 
stated that "[w]hether Ornelas-Chavez belongs to a protected 
social group [was] not at issue in this appeal," referring to the 
"gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico" social group 
that was affirmed in Hernandez-Montiel. 76 Both the Reyes-
Reyes and Ornelas-Chavez decisions indicate recognition by 
the Ninth Circuit of a particular social group as applied to 
transgender applicants. However the Ninth Circuit has 
consistently limited this group to "gay men with female sexual 
identities" from Latin America. 
3. Morales v. Gonzales: Recognition ofa Transsexual Asylum 
Applicant 
The 2007 decision of Morales v. Gonzales77 marked the 
Ninth Circuit's first use of the term "transsexual" in the body of 
an immigration decision, referring to the asylum applicant as a 
"male-to-female transsexual.,,78 Morales, a Mexican national, 
was identified at birth as male and began using a female 
identity at age fourteen because "she always felt that she was 
more of a female than a male.,,79 During her hearing, Morales 
claimed she was raped by her brother at a young age and on 
several other instances occasions by other individuals. 80 
Morales also stated that she was arrested several times for 
dressing as a woman.8! The facts indicate that Morales 
returned to Mexico once to receive breast implants and that she 
has since feared returning to Mexico because "she is 'more' of a 
woman now," and as a result, was more likely to be assaulted 
in Mexico.82 
Morales invoked her asylum claim as a defensive strategy 
against charges by Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
that she was an alien present in the United States who has not 
private parties the government is unwilling or unable to control need not have reported 
that persecution to the authorities if he can convincingly establish that doing so would 
have been futile or have subjected him to further abuse"). 
76 Id. at 1056. 
77 Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). 
78 Morales, 478 F.3d at 975. 
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been admitted or paroled83 and she was removable because she 
was convicted of communication with a minor for immoral 
purposes, a crime of moral turpitude.84 Consequently, the court 
did not have to determine Morales's particular social group, as 
her crime ultimately made her ineligible for asylum.85 
Interestingly, the court mentioned the immigration judge's 
inquiry into the Mexican government's position on transgender 
people and made a determination that, ''but for Morales's 
conviction for communication with a minor for immoral 
purposes, [the immigration judge] would have found her 
eligible for asylum under Hernandez-Montiel v. IN8.,,86 
However, in marked distinction from Hernandez-Montiel, there 
was no identification of Morales as a gay man with a female 
identity, either by the court or by Morales herself. Rather, the 
court expressly referred to her as a male-to-female transsexual, 
noted that she had had breast-implant surgery, and referred to 
her using the feminine pronoun.87 
Based on the finding that Morales was ineligible for 
asylum and withholding of removal, the Ninth Circuit was able 
to sidestep the implications of Morales's transsexual identity 
and her asylum application based on a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 88 However, if the case had rested solely on 
Morales's membership in a particular social group, the court 
would have been forced to determine whether Morales's 
identity was legally and sociologically appropriate under the 
established Hernandez-Montielparticular social group. 
The aforementioned cases highlight the unnecessarily 
limited definition of "particular social group" as the 
83 Morales, 478 F.3d at 977; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 
212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2009). 
84 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(l), 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(l) (Westlaw 2009). 
85 Morales, 478 F.3d at 984. The Ninth Circuit remanded the asylum and 
withholding of removal claims because the immigration judge erroneously relied on 
facts pertaining to a crime of which Morales was not convicted. Id. at 984-85. 
88 Id. at 977,984. 
87 Id. at 975-76. 
88 Id. at 985. The Ninth Circuit determined the immigration judge applied an 
incorrect legal standard in determining that Morales was ineligible for Convention 
Against Torture (CAT) relief and remanded for further proceedings. The CAT does not 
require that the persecution be on account of one of the five protected grounds. 8 
C.F.R. § 208. 16(c) (Westlaw 2009). The CAT was ratified by the United States Senate 
under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, as implemented by 
section 2242. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,2681-821 (1998). 
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"homosexual male with female identity" that has been applied 
to transgender applicants with varying gender and sexual 
orientation identifications. It is notable that there was no 
indication the Ninth Circuit made any attempt to determine 
the applicants' sexual orientation. Instead, the court defaulted 
to the descriptor "homosexual male," despite the fact that the 
applicants may have identified as heterosexual females. 
B. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE HERNANDEZ-MoNTIEL 
APPROACH FOR TRANSGENDER APPLICANTS 
1. The "Conduct VS. Identity" Distinction 
While great strides have been made for homosexual 
asylum applicants, significant gaps remain that may have a 
troubling effect upon transgender applicants. The test for 
"particular social group" rightly remains contextual and fluid. 
However, In re Toboso-Alronso established that the 
requirement of membership in a particular social group focuses 
on identity to the exclusion of conduct.89 Consequently, as 
asylum law currently stands, only persecution on the basis of 
identity (not conduct that reflects identity) merits protection. 90 
This "conduct versus identity" distinction has particular 
consequences for the trans gender applicant who may not 
identify as homosexual and thus has not engaged in 
"homosexual" acts. Two recent cases that highlight this 
distinction are Kimumwe v. Gonzalel1 and Maldonado v. 
Attorney General of the United States.92 Although neither of 
these cases involves a transgender or transsexual applicant, 
they present analogous issues and difficulties that a 
transgender applicant would face under a court's scrutiny and 
analysis. 
89 Pfitsch, supra note 61, at 70; see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION 
AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY 994 (4th ed. 2005) (stating that Alfonso-Toboso 
established that a claimant could be persecuted solely for being homosexual, as 
distinguished from engaging in homosexual acts). 
90 Pfitsch, supra note 61, at 70 ("As the law currently stands, an LGBT 
immigrant persecuted on the basis of her homosexual conduct may not be granted 
asylum if she does not sufficiently identity as LGBT or if her persecution is rooted in 
laws regulating sexual activity rather that focusing on sexual identity."). 
91 Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 319 (8th Cir. 2005). 
92 Maldonado v. Attorney Gen. of U.S. , 188 F. App'x 101 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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In Kimumwe, the Eighth Circuit upheld the immigration 
judge and BIA's finding that the applicant was punished for his 
improper sexual conduct, rather than his sexual orientation.93 
Kimumwe was expelled from secondary school in Zimbabwe at 
the age of twelve for having sexual relations with another male 
student.94 Later, Kimumwe and another male student, a 
sixteen-year-old whom Kimumwe claimed to be in love with, 
got drunk together and had sex.95 Mter the other boy 
complained to authorities about the incident, Kimumwe was 
arrested and detained by the police, ostensibly under a sexual-
assault charge, although the jailer indicated it was because of 
Kimumwe's homosexuality.96 Kimumwe was detained for two 
months, charged with sodomy and sexual assault, and released 
only after prison officials were bribed.97 The immigration judge 
found that Kimumwe's problems in Zimbabwe "were not based 
simply on his sexual orientation, but instead resulted [from] 
his engaging in prohibited sexual conduct."98 
The Eighth Circuit held the immigration judge and BIA's 
distinction between identity and conduct was justified.99 The 
court stated that since any sexual conduct between students 
was illegal, Kimumwe would have been expelled whether 
Kimumwe had sex with a boy or a gir1.100 The court affirmed 
the immigration judge's finding that "the actions of 
Zimbabwean authorities in these instances were not based on 
Kimumwe's sexual orientation, but rather on Kimumwe's 
involvement in prohibited sexual conduct."lol The Eighth 
Circuit also cited to the immigration judge's finding that 
Kimumwe presented no objective evidence to confirm his 
homosexuality. 102 Although the majority focused on the police 
statement, which stated that the alleged sexual misconduct 
was the basis for Kimumwe's arrest, there was no evidence in 
the record that indicated whether the other boy, who was not 
93 Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 323. 
94 Id. at 322. 
95 Id. at 321. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (brackets in original). 
99 Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 322. 
100 Id. 
WIld. 
102 Id. at 321. 
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gay, was arrested or charged with any sexual misconduct. l03 
Further, the majority ignored the fact that the political and 
social climate in Zimbabwe at the time was blatantly hostile 
toward homosexuals.l04 In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice 
Heaney disputed the immigration judge's finding that 
Kimumwe was not a homosexual and that he "was not 
punished because of his status as a homosexual, but rather 
because of the apparently coercive circumstances in which he 
engaged in sexual activity."105 
The reasoning behind the Eighth Circuit's holding is 
disconcerting, particularly because individuals persecuted for 
one of the other established categories are not held to the same 
exacting standard of proving their identity. For instance, a 
claim of religious persecution would not be opposed or denied 
on the ground that the persecution is solely for praying or 
attending services; instead, the persecution would be treated as 
being on account of the individual's belonging to a particular 
religion. 106 Yet this "conduct versus identity" distinction IS 
applied to the detriment of homosexual applicants. 107 
103 Id. at 322. 
104 As Judge Heaney wrote in his dissent: 
In 1995, [Presidentl Mugabe publicly referred to gays as 'sodomites and perverts' 
and declared that homosexual people had 'no rights at all.' Mugabe's anti-gay 
rhetoric became stronger soon thereafter, attacking Britain's tolerance of 
homosexuals, [whol Mugabe believed were 'worse than dogs and pigs.' In 
speeches, Mugabe has promised that Zimbabwe will do 'everything in its power' 
to combat homosexuality and has described homosexual relations as 'an 
abomination and decadence.' Mugabe remains in power today. 
Id., 431 F.3d at 324 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
105 The immigration judge stated that Kimumwe presented no objective evidence 
to confirm his homosexuality, despite the fact that Kimumwe testified he was openly 
gay and realized he was gay at seven years old. Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 323-24. 
106 O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 196. 
107 Id.; see also Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005) (overturning 
the immigration judge's fmding and BIA's affirmance that denied asylum to a 
Lebanese homosexual with AIDS on the basis of the conduct versus identity 
distinction). The Ninth Circuit found significant problems with the Attorney General's 
argument that "the future persecution Karouni fears would not be on account of his 
status as a homosexual, but rather on account of him committing future homosexual 
acts." Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1172 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the Court quoted 
part of the immigration judge's oral decision, which stated that "[tlhere has been 
evidence to show that individuals are prosecuted for homosexual conduct. [But tlhere 
has been no evidence that mere homosexuality is against the law in Lebanon." Id. In 
overturning the immigration judge and BIA, the Ninth Circuit held there can be "no 
appreciable difference between an individual, such as Karouni, being persecuted for 
being a homosexual and being persecuted for engaging in homosexual acts." Id. at 
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In contrast to Kimumwe, the Third Circuit, in Maldonado 
v. Attorney General of the United States,I08 took a different 
approach to the BIA and immigration judge's arbitrary 
"conduct versus identity" distinction. Maldonado, an 
Argentinean applicant, was repeatedly harassed and detained 
by police over twenty times during the course of several years, 
often while leaving gay clubs. 109 In one incident, the police 
detained Maldonado for over six hours, during which he was 
told by the police that "you faggots deserve to die" and "you 
need a hot iron bar stuck up your ass.,,110 Both the immigration 
judge and the BIA adopted the government's contention that, 
while the allegations may be true, they were not inflicted "on 
account of' his membership in a particular social group, but 
instead on account of his leaving gay clubs late at night, acts 
that the applicant was free to modifY.lll The Third Circuit 
overturned the IJ and BIA's ruling, finding it was "a distinction 
without a difference. The fact that Maldonado was targeted by 
the police only while engaged in an elective activity does not 
foreclose the possibility that he was persecuted on account of 
his membership in a particular social groUp.,,1l2 The Third 
Circuit remanded the case to the BIA for further review.1l3 
Kim um we and Maldonado illustrate the illusory 
distinction that courts continue to make when adjudicating 
asylum applications for persecution on account of homosexual 
conduct, rather than identity, in order to justifY denials of relief 
to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender applicants. This 
arbitrary differentiation is not applied to protection sought by 
claimants who are not sexual minorities. 1l4 In the cases 
discussed above, at least petitioners Kimumwe and Maldonado 
could claim membership in a protected social group, 
homosexuals, to bolster their claim. This holds potentially 
serious consequences for transgender applicants, as they may 
not identifY as either lesbian or gay. Consequently, while they 
may engage in what others would identifY as homosexual acts, 
1173. 
108 Maldonado v. Attorney Gen. of U.S. 188 F. App'x 101 (3d Cir. 2006). 
109 [d. at 103. 
llO [d. 
III [d. at 104; see also O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 203. 
ll2 Maldonado, 188 F. App'x at 104. 
ll3 [d. at 105. 
ll4 O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 196. 
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their identity may be heterosexual, thus calling into question 
their protection under the accepted particular social group, 
homosexual. 
2. Imputed Gay Identity 
To address the conduct and identity distinction discussed 
above, critics have encouraged transgender applicants to take 
advantage of the "imputed gay identity" theory, in which the 
homosexual label has been applied by the persecutors instead 
of the applicant individual. 115 This would allow trans gender 
applicants to prove their cases without necessarily having to 
establish that their persecutors targeted them because of their 
transgender identity. 116 As Joseph Landau points out, 
"[a]dvancing the imputed gay identity theory has the 
advantage of placing transgender asylum seekers into a 
category of persons already deemed eligible for 'particular 
social group' status as opposed to having to persuade a fact-
finder that transgender persons organically constitute a 
particular social group.,,117 
The conceptual underpinnings of the "imputed gay 
identity" theory are found in Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 118 a Third 
Circuit decision from 2003. Amanfi, a Ghanaian man, claimed 
persecution by members of a cult and by the Ghanaian police, 
both of which viewed him as a homosexual, although Amanfi 
did not identifY as a homosexual.119 Amanfi claimed he was 
approached by several men, claiming to be police, who drove 
him to an isolated area and locked him in a room.120 However, 
the men were not police but "macho men," essentially private 
security guards hired by individuals to settle disputes. 121 The 
men told Amanfi that his father was murdered and that a 
similar fate would befall him. 122 
Amanfi believed the men planned to offer him as part of a 
115 Landau, supra note 36, at 258. 
116 Neilson, supra note 27, at 288. 
117 Landau, supra note 36, at 258. 
118 Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003). 
119 Id. at 72l. 
120 Id. at 723. 
121 Id. 
122 Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 723. 
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human sacrifice. 123 Based on this belief, and on an 
understanding that the cult believed homosexuals were not 
suitable for human sacrifice, Amanfi engaged in a homosexual 
act with another man kept captive by the "macho men.,,124 
When they were discovered, Amanfi and the other man were 
severely beaten before being brought to the police, who 
informed the public that Amanfi was a homosexua1.125 Amanfi 
claimed the police beat him daily for nearly two months until 
he was able to escape from captivity.126 Amanfi did not identify 
himself as a homosexual. 127 Nevertheless, his captors imputed 
his homosexual conduct into a homosexual identity and 
persecuted him based on this belief. 128 Amanfi argued that his 
claims should be analyzed from the perspective of him imputed 
status as a homosexual rather than actual membership in this 
. I 129 socIa group. 
The BIA reasoned that Amanfi could not qualify as a 
member of the homosexual social group because he testified 
that he was not in fact a homosexual. 13o The BIA opined that 
extending the imputed political opinion rationale to imputed 
sexual orientation status was "without any legal precedent."131 
The Third Circuit reversed the BIA, holding imputed identity 
on account of perceived sexual orientation was legally 
sufficient. 132 The Third Circuit found that Amanfi's claim of 
imputed membership in a particular social group, 
homosexuals,133 was consistent with other circuit opinions 
discussing imputed political opinion, 134 as well as precedential 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 




129 Id. at 724. 
130 Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 724. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 719. 
133 Id. at 729. 
134 Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 729 n.4 (citing AI Naijar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289 
(l1th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that proof of an imputed political opinion would have 
qualified as persecution "on account" of political opinion under Immigration and 
Nationality Act); Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 323, 331 (lst Cir. 2000) ("There is no doubt 
that asylum can be granted if the applicant has been persecuted or has a well-founded 
fear of persecution because he is erroneously thought to hold a particular political 
opinion."); and Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1998) ("One way that an 
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BIA cases and administrative regulations and letters. 135 
Consequently, for the first time, a claim of imputed homosexual 
status based on the persecutor's beliefs was recognized by a 
court without regard to the applicant's actual sexual 
orientation. 
Many countries have no concept of "transgender," resulting 
in the perception that all gender non-conforming behavior is 
synonymous with homosexuality.136 When the persecutory act 
relates to the victim's sexual orientation, the imputed gay 
identity may afford transgender individuals a pathway to 
asylum. Under current U.S. asylum law, the claimant must 
not only show a well-founded fear of persecution but must also 
produce corroborating evidence that the persecutor's intent was 
premised upon a belief about his or her sexual orientation.137 
While the doctrine of imputed gay identity may provide a 
viable avenue of relief for transgender applicants, it is not clear 
whether claims based on imputed membership in other 
particular social groups would be successful. 138 In the case of 
adjudicators who do not understand the distinction between 
gender identity and sexual orientation, this may lead to 
unpredictable results. For instance, if persecutors attacked a 
heterosexual transgender woman solely for exhibiting traits 
that fall outside the gender norms in that country (and not for 
being perceived as a homosexual woman), then she has not 
been persecuted for homosexuality, imputed or not. Under the 
Hernandez-Montiel particular social group, as well as the 
imputed gay identity, she would be left without an established 
applicant can establish 'political opinion' under the INA is to show an imputed political 
opinion.")). 
135 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76597-98 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.15(b)) (An asylum applicant must demonstrate membership in one of the five 
protected categories (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group or political opinion) or "on account of what the persecutor perceives to be the 
applicant's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion."). At present, these regulations have not yet been promulgated. See 
also INS General Counsel Opinion Letter, Genco Op. No. 93-1, 1993 WL 1503948 (INS) 
("Persecution inflicted because the persecutor erroneously imputes to the victim one of 
the protected characteristics set forth in Section 101(a)(42) can constitute persecution 
'on account of that characteristic for the purposes of asylum or refugee analysis."). 
136 Landau, supra note 37, at 261. 
137 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482-84 (1992) (holding that an asylum 
applicant must provide some direct or circumstantial proof of persecutor's motive). 
136 Neilson, supra note 27, at 285-86. 
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means of redress under current asylum law.139 
III. THE TRANSGENDER IDENTITY AS A DISTINCT PARTICULAR 
SOCIAL GROUP FOR PURPOSES OF AsYLUM 
89 
The creation of a "transgender" particular social group as 
distinct from the previously identified "gay men with female 
sexual identities" serves the purposes of being more inclusive 
to the broad array of transgender identities. Currently, this 
particular social group accounts for a narrow subset of people 
persecuted on account of their sexual identity and orientation. 
In comparison, if a heterosexual female with a deep male 
identity is subject to persecution, the court would have to 
create a new particular social group to accurately reflect this 
identity. The same would be true for an asexual male with a 
female identity. These claims can be made simpler by adopting 
a single social group to which they all belong: the trans gender 
particular social group. 
Instead of requiring an applicant to prove the intent of the 
persecutor and to then produce corroborating evidence of the 
imputed identity, courts should recognize that persecution "on 
account of' a transgender or transsexual identity satisfies the 
requirements for establishing asylum. If the BIA established 
by precedent that transgender identity was part of an 
established particular social group, it would not be necessary 
for applicants to circuitously prove the erroneous sexual 
orientation their persecutor attributed to them, thus making 
the burden of proof in an asylum case more accessible for 
transgender applicants. 
A potential criticism of the creation of a transgender 
particular social group is that it would lead to a flood of 
fraudulent claims.140 It is impossible to refute or affirm this 
139 Id. at 281 n.1D2 (stating that a person who put forward a claim based on 
homosexual orientation who did not consider himself or herself to be a homosexual 
could be considered a "frivolous" claim. A "frivolous" claim is defined as an application 
in which "any of its material elements is deliberately fabricated."). Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.20 (West 2008)). Following the same logic, the court could make a frivolous 
fmding against an individual who filed a claim for persecution on account of "imputed 
homosexuality" if the claimant could not show that the persecutor was motivated to 
persecute because of his or her erroneous perception. 
140 Lauren Smiley, Border Crossers, SF WEEKLY, Nov. 26, 2008, at 13, available 
at http://www.sfweekly.coml2008-11-26/newslborder-crossersl1 (citing Dan Stein, 
president of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a national organization 
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criticism, as the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Service does not break down its general asylum statistics 
according to the basis of the claim.141 Accordingly, there are no 
official statistics to indicate the number of sexual orientation or 
gender identity asylum claims filed or approved. 142 Another 
criticism is that a "transgender social group" might be "mired 
in obfuscation and ambiguity."143 Perhaps in response to these 
criticisms, the courts have rejected claims for asylum on the 
rationale that the persecution claimed is too prevalent or the 
proposed social group is too broad. 144 For example, the Ninth 
Circuit has avoided "sweeping categories"145 and has suggested 
that social groups should be "readily identifiable.,,146 
In turn, asylum applicants have proposed a broad range of 
group definitions, using descriptors to fit within the contours of 
a social group that is narrow and "readily identifiable.,,147 
However, once a narrow and descriptive particular social group 
is developed, it has the problematic outcome of creating a 
checklist for judges seeking a particular type of trait on the 
part of the applicant before recognition of his or her 
membership. 148 As society in the United States often conflates 
aimed at curbing illegal immigration). 
141 Deborah A. Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and Sexual 
Stereotypes in Sexual Orientation Asylum Claims, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 135, 141 
(2006). 
142 I d. at 142, n.38 ("One estimate indicates that over the five year period from 
1994 to 1999, which spans the inclusion of homosexuals as a 'particular social group,' 
the Attorney General 'granted asylum to about 300 gays and lesbians.'") (citing Denise 
C. Hammond, Immigration and Sexual Orientation: Developing Standards, Options, 
and Obstacles, 77 No.4 INTERPRETER RELEASES 113,118 (Jan. 24, 2000». 
143 Michael A. Scaperlanda, Kulturkampf in the Backwaters: Homosexuality and 
Immigration Law, 11 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 475, 505 (2002) (describing decisions 
following Toboso-Alfonso and questioning whether persons with a disfavored sexual 
orientation can constitute a "particular social group"). 
144 B.J. Chisholm, Comment, Credible Definitions: A Critique of Us. Asylum 
Law's Treatment of Gender-Related Claims, 44 HOW. L.J. 427, 441 (2001). 
145 I d. (citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1573 (9th Cir. 1986». 
146 Id. (citing Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000». 
147 I d. at 432-33 (citing Matter ofR-A-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 629, 630, Interim Decision 
3624 (B.LA. September 25, 2008) ("Guatemalan women who have been involved 
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live 
under male domination."); Matter of Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996) 
("young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had [female genital 
mutilation), as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice."». 
148 Cf. Morgan, supra note 140, at 154 (arguing that immigration judges make 
decisions based on racialized sexual stereotypes and culturally specific notions of 
homosexuality, thus discriminating against those who do not conform). 
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gender and sexual identity, transgender individuals face a 
heightened struggle with stereotypes in asylum proceedings.149 
Accordingly, this could lead to arbitrary and erroneous 
decisions made on the basis of stereotypes and 
misconceptions. 150 For example, an immigration judge could 
encounter a transgender male claimant who has not yet begun 
taking testosterone or other hormone injections and has not 
had surgery to remove his breasts for fear of persecution, yet 
has always felt he was more male than female. As the asylum 
adjudicators mirror the misconceptions of society, the result is 
that a transgender person might be stigmatized both for being 
transgender and then as a homosexual, even though the 
transgender applicant may identify as heterosexual.151 
Accordingly, education and training of adjudicators on the 
fluidity of the gender identity is critical. 152 
Judicial precedent forces a transgender applicant who is 
not homosexual to adjust the contours of his or her claim so as 
to fall within the established Hernandez-Montiel social 
group. 153 This places an unfair burden on the applicant. The 
solution is for the BIA and the courts of appeals to hold that 
transgender people form a particular social group, thus 
creating a more inclusive social group that recognizes the fluid 
gender/sex dichotomy.154 In fact, one commentator has 
suggested that "the relevant social group could be framed as 
'individuals born with one anatomical sex who believe their 
149 Benson, supra note 22, at 57 (citing Nat!. Ctr. for Transgender Equal. & 
Transgender L. Ctr., The Real ID Act: Bad Law for Our Community ['II. 7], 
http://www .realnightmare.org/imagesiFileINCTE %20realid. pdf). 
150 Morgan, supra note 140, at 154 (positing that adjudicators' own narrow 
understanding of sexual identity encourages fraudulent sexual orientation claims 
because typical questions posed to determine if an applicant is "really gay" reveal 
unconscious adherence to sexual stereotypes). 
151 Id. (citing PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A 
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 8 (2000), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloadslreportslreportslTransgenderEquality.pdf). 
152 I d. at 159-60. (Training would provide "concrete, factual reference information 
on the various ways in which sexuality is expressed around the world, as well as 
developing methods by which judges could assess whether they were employing 
stereotypes in their decision making."). 
153 Neilson, supra note 27, at 276 ("There is no precedent directly addressing 
asylum based solely on transgender identity."). 
154 Id. at 277 (stating that although most transgender individuals do not fmd 
their sex or gender to be immutable, the debate surrounding the rigidity of gender and 
sex should not preclude a fmding that transgender identity can form the basis of 
membership in a particular social group). 
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anatomical sex does not match their gender.',,155 
An illustrative example of this type of recognition is the 
limited advances the federal courts have made in extending 
protection to transgender victims of employment 
discrimination on account of gender. While rare, they are 
indicative of the advances courts are making toward full 
recognition of the transgender identity. However, one 
distinction from asylum decisions is that the courts are 
accurately describing claimants as transgender or transsexual 
and, in some cases, affording them relief based on this 
recognition, rather than applying a multitude of qualifiers. 
Several courts have given an expansive interpretation of what 
constitutes gender discrimination, based, in part, on the 
reasoning behind the United States Supreme Court's 1989 
decision Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 156 In that decision the 
Court addressed harassment directed at a woman who did not 
conform to traditional gender stereotypes, holding that Title 
VII's l57 reference to "sex" encompassed both the biological 
differences between men and women and gender 
discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical 
gender norms. 158 
The Ninth Circuit was the first to adopt a broad 
interpretation of "sex" in deciding Schwenk v. Hartford 159 
Although the case did not involve Title VII, the court 
nevertheless concluded that a transgender plaintiff could prove 
sex-harassment was discrimination by showing that the 
harasser's conduct was motivated by a belief that the plaintiff 
failed to conform to gender stereotypes.160 The First Circuit has 
155 Id. 
156 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Title VII prohibits an 
employer from discriminating against a woman who was considered to be too 
masculine). 
157 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (Westlaw 2009) ("It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin .... "). 
158 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.s. at 250-5l. 
159 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (protection under 
the Gender Motivated Violence Act extends to transsexuals). 
160 Id. at 1202; see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 
(9th Cir. 2001) (extending Schwenk and holding that claimant had claim under Title 
VII based on comments made by male co-workers and supervisor, repeatedly reminding 
claimant that he did not conform to their gender-based stereotypes, by referring to him 
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also afforded transgender claimants protection outside the 
employment context, by reinstating an Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act claim on behalf of transgender plaintiff who 
alleged that he was denied an opportunity to apply for a loan 
because he was not dressed in masculine attire.161 
The Sixth Circuit has gone the furthest in affording 
protection to transgender claimants by explicitly stating that 
Title VII protected transgender employees. In Smith v. City of 
Salem, Ohio,162 the court held that discrimination against a 
transgender person who failed to act in accordance with his 
anatomical sex was no different than the discrimination faced 
by the plaintiff in Pnce Waterhouse. 163 The court held that the 
use of labels such as "transsexual" or "homosexual" would not 
affect claims by plaintiffs alleging discrimination because of 
their gender nonconformity. 164 In addition, several district 
courts have impliedly or explicitly held that Title VII extends 
protection to transsexuals.165 
It should be noted that most circuits continue to deny 
protection to transgender applicants alleging discrimination on 
the basis of "sex." However, some courts are beginning to 
acknowledge that transgender individuals constitute a 
legitimate demographic and are entitled to protection under 
as "she" and "her."). 
161 Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000). 
162 Smith v. City of Salem, 369 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2004) (amended & superseded 
by Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
163 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Barnes v. 
City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming the Smith decision by 
holding that discrimination against a transgender woman based on a person's gender 
non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination under Title VII); Myers v. 
Cuyahoga County, 182 F. App'x 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that "Title VII 
protects transsexual persons from discrimination for failing to act in accordance and/or 
identify with their perceived sex or gender"). 
164 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Shannon H. 
Tan, When Steve is Fired ror Becoming Susan: Why Courts and Legislators Need To 
Protect Transgender Employees from Discrimination, 37 STETSON L. REV. 579, 591 
(2008). 
165 See Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 
WL 22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding that "[tlranssexuals are not 
gender-less, they are either male or female and are thus protected under Title VII to 
the extend that they are discriminated against on the basis of sex."); Schroer v. 
Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that a male-to-female 
transsexual plaintiff was "not seeking acceptance as a man with feminine traits," but 
rather wanted acceptance to express her identity as a female, not as a feminine male). 
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this identity.166 Courts adjudicating asylum petitions should do 
the same. While claimants in the asylum context are arguably 
afforded relief more consistently than those seeking protection 
within the federal employment-discrimination context, the 
immigration courts do so by automatically ascribing a 
"homosexual" identifier to those claimants. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As case law currently stands, transgender asylum 
applicants have only a narrowly defined particular social 
group, generally that of homosexual men with female identities 
from Latin America, that they may use as a basis of protection 
from persecution. However, these finite descriptors have the 
potential to preclude a successful claim if the applicant does 
not satisfy one of the criteria. Although one has to hope that 
the BIA or a court of appeals would liberally extend the same 
protection afforded the petitioner in Hernandez-Montielto, say, 
a transsexual female-to-male from Eastern Europe,167 existing 
decisions would not force this outcome, and courts could far too 
easily distinguish those circumstances from those found in 
previous decisions. 
While gender-nonconforming individuals have won some 
legal battles in the past few years, namely by courts beginning 
to acknowledge a broadened concept of sex and gender, the 
courtroom continues to be a daunting forum for gender-
nonconforming people to seek asylum. Recent Ninth Circuit 
opinions recognize that trans gender individuals constitute a 
legitimate minority who are being persecuted because of 
gender variances. However, without express affirmation by the 
BIA or the federal courts of appeals that the transgender 
identity constitutes a distinct and particular social group for 
purposes of asylum,168 transgender and transsexual individuals 
are forced to subsume themselves into discrete and established 
social groups that have been accorded recognition by the 
courts. Requiring applicants to do so commits further violence 
166 Eno, supra note 5, at 790. 
167 At present there is a dearth of case law concerning female-to-male transgender 
applicants, whether straight or gay-identified. See generally Landau, supra note 36, at 
263 ("One drawback is the one-sidedness of the Ninth Circuit's rulings, which fail (at 
least for now) to protect female-to-male transgender persons."). 
16B Neilson, supra note 27, at 274. 
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on an already-persecuted identity. The ethical principles of the 
asylum system were designed to afford protection to those most 
marginalized. This inclusive system is fluid and contextual, 
and thus courts are able to adjust the concept of a "particular 
social group" to legally and sociologically align the applicant 
with an appropriate group. Transgender applicants are not 
seeking special protection, but rather equal protection under 
the law. Consequently, the courts should broaden their 
existing transgender social group and create one that accounts 
for varying transgender and transsexual identities. 
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